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Abstract
Human beings tend to avoid effort, if a less effortful option is equally rewarding. However, and in sharp contrast to this 
claim, we repeatedly found that (a subset of) participants deliberately choose the more difficult of two tasks in a voluntary 
task switching (VTS) paradigm even though avoidance of the difficult task was allowed (Jurczyk et al., Motivation Science 
5:295–313, 2019). In this study, we investigate to what extent the deliberate switch to the difficult task is determined by 
the actual objective or the subjective effort costs for the difficult task. In two experiments, participants (N = 100, each) first 
went through several blocks of voluntary task choices between an easy and a difficult task. After that, they worked through 
an effort discounting paradigm, EDT, (Westbrook et al., PLoS One 8(7):e68210, 2013) that required participants to make 
a series of iterative choices between re-doing a difficult task block for a fixed amount or an easy task block for a variable 
(lower) amount of money until the individual indifference point was reached. In Experiment 1, the EDT comprised the same 
tasks from the VTS, in Experiment 2, EDT used another set of easy vs. difficult tasks. Results showed that the voluntary 
switch to the difficult task was mostly predicted by the objective performance costs and only marginally be the subjective 
effort cost. The switch to the difficult task may thus be less irrational than originally thought and at its avoidance at least 
partially driven by economic considerations.
Explaining human action selection
Human beings have a huge repertoire of potential behaviors 
they can select from at any given moment. And it is one of 
the core questions of psychology to find out what determines 
this choice. One aspect that has moved into the focus of 
research during the last decade is how the expected costs 
of an action modulate its selection (Berkman et al., 2017; 
Kurzban et al., 2013; Shenhav et al., 2013, 2021). Accord-
ing to the law of least effort (Hull, 1943), humans always 
strive for the least effortful (costly, that is) behavior. While 
originally restricted to physical effort, accumulating evi-
dence suggests that this effort avoidance also holds for cog-
nitive effort (Kool et al., 2010). However, the world is full of 
examples where people deliberately go for the more effortful 
choice even in leisure activities like mountain climbing or 
chess playing instead of taking the cable car or watching TV 
(Inzlicht et al., 2018). One potential reason for this effort 
paradox might be that people have different objective and 
subjective effort costs for the same task. That is, the trained 
mountain climber may in fact have to invest less physical 
effort (low objective costs) and the chess player may enjoy 
the cognitive effort of chess playing (low subjective costs). 
In this paper, we aim to investigate whether and how the 
objective and subjective costs for a given task may in part 
solve the effort paradox.
In the laboratory, the choice between different cognitive 
tasks can be investigated with the voluntary task switching 
paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005; Arrington et al., 
2014). The typical finding in this paradigm is that partici-
pants strongly prefer to repeat the task and barely choose to 
switch unless the instructions tell them to do so at least on 
a certain subset of trials (e.g., (Kessler et al., 2009). This 
repetition bias (the strong preference for task repetitions) 
can be taken as another indication of effort avoidance (Kool 
et al., 2010), because participants avoid the switch costs that 
are typically associated with a task switch (Dreisbach, 2012; 
Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al., 
2010). That means, any truly voluntary task switch (truly 
 * Gesine Dreisbach 
 Gesine.Dreisbach@ur.de
1 Department of Psychology, University of Regensburg, 
Universitätsstraße 31, 93053 Regensburg, Germany
2 Bremen University, Bremen, Germany
 Psychological Research
1 3
in the sense that the instructions would allow participants 
to always repeat the task on free choices) contradicts the 
law of least effort. Interestingly, there is evidence that the 
voluntary switch rate can reliably be increased when spe-
cific reward conditions are met: Fröber and Dreisbach (2016) 
used cues that announced either a high or low reward ran-
domly changing between trials. And they repeatedly found 
increased switch rates when reward prospect increased from 
one trial to the next (but not when reward remained high) 
even though the reward was provided contingent on fast and 
correct responding but not on the choice to switch (Frö-
ber & Dreisbach, 2016; Fröber et al., 2018, 2019). What is 
even more, Jurczyk et al., (2019) showed that this sequential 
reward effect of higher VSR when reward prospect increased 
is also found when participants have to switch between 
an easy and a difficult task: while only few participants 
switched to the difficult task (when they could also repeat 
the easy task), those who did, did so especially when reward 
prospect increased (see Fig. 1).
Recently, it was argued that the general reward sequence 
effect of higher VSR when reward prospect increased (as 
compared to unchanged high reward) could be explained by 
a lowering of the updating threshold in working memory in 
response to the unexpected in increase in reward (Cools & 
D’Esposito, 2011; Dreisbach & Fröber, 2019). The assumed 
mechanism could be that a lower threshold goes along with 
a change in brain signal variability, thereby increasing the 
probability that a less activated task (like the one that was 
not just recently executed) is chosen (Faisal et al., 2008; 
Garrett et al., 2015; Waschke et al., 2021). However, to date 
we have not yet identified why a subset of participants vol-
untarily switches to the more difficult of two tasks (when 
reward prospect increases). One reason that we aim to inves-
tigate here might be that some participants experience the 
more difficult task not as effortful as others do. And this 
might be true either because for them, executing the dif-
ficult task is in fact less costly, or, simply because they do 
not mind the higher costs. Here, we will use the individual 
reaction time difference between the easy and the difficult 
task as a proxy for the actual objective performance costs. 
And we will use a cognitive effort discounting task (EDT) to 
measure the individual subjective effort costs for the difficult 
task as recently introduced by Westbrook and colleagues 
(Westbrook & Braver, 2015; Westbrook et al., 2013). Partici-
pants will first work through several task switching blocks 
using the hybrid task switching paradigm with 50% forced 
choices (half switch, half repetitions) and 50% free choices. 
The hybrid paradigm allows to abandon any task instruction 
that asks participants to switch at least on a subset of trials 
and instead leaves it entirely to the participant which task to 
choose on free choice trials (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2017). As 
in Jurczyk et al. (2019), we will use a difficult and an easy 
task and will present a cue that announces either a high or 
low reward contingent on performance (but not on choice). 
After this task switching phase, the EDT will be conducted. 
Participants will have to choose whether they would be 
willing to do another block only including the difficult task 
for 2€ or a block of the easy task for 1€. If the participant 
choses the difficult task, the amount for the easy task will be 
increased by 50 Cents, if they go for the easy task, it will be 
decreased by 50 Cents. This procedure will be repeated for 
five more offers, and for each subsequent offer, the reward 
available for the single task block will be adjusted by half 
as much as the previous adjustment (see “Methods”). The 
difference between the final offer for the easy task and the 
2€ then determines the subjective effort costs for a given 
participant: it is the amount of money a participant is willing 
to forego to avoid the more difficult task. The main question 
of interest is whether and to what extent the objective per-
formance costs (individual RT difference between difficult 
and easy task) and the subjective effort costs will predict the 
voluntary switch rate to the difficult task. Note that decid-
ing to switch to the difficult task is only possible when the 
easy task was just executed. That means, on voluntary task 
switches to the difficult task, participants not only choose a 
more difficult task, they also choose the less activated task. 
It follows that switching to the difficult task should have the 
most effortful consequences.1 And aside from the overall 
Fig. 1  Voluntary switch rate (VSR) as a function of task type (easy/
difficult) and reward sequence (from Jurczyk et al., 2019)
1 We are aware of the phenomenon of asymmetrical switch costs 
which describe the well documented observation that a switch to the 
more difficult task can be easier than a switch to the easier task. How-
ever, this asymmetry is typically only observed when two tasks that 
operate on the identical stimulus set are used. Since we will use uni-
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VSR to the difficult task, we will also use the VSR to the 
difficult task specifically when reward prospect increases as 
criterion, because this is where we found the highest VSR 





The minimum sample size of a multiple regression with 
two predictors and a medium effect size of 0.15, a power 
of 0.95 and α = 0.05 would require 74 participants (Faul 
et al., 2009). To be on the save side, given the novelty of 
our approach, we decided upfront to collect data from 100 
participants. Consequently, 100 students from the University 
of Regensburg participated in this study for course credit 
or money (6€). On top, they could earn up to 2€ in the last 
effort discounting block (description see below). Subjects 
were between 18 and 47 years old (M = 22.9 years; SD = 3.9). 
Of all participants, 41 studied Psychology, 84 were female 
and 7 were left-handed. All participants had normal color 
vision as confirmed by means of an Ishihara test. Informed 
consent was provided by all subjects prior to the experiment.
Apparatus
The experiment was run using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA) on a 19-inch TFT-mon-
itor (display resolution at 1280 * 1024 pixels, refresh rate 
60 Hz). Responses were collected with a QWERTZ-key-
board, using “y” and “x” as the left and right response key 
for one task (left hand), and “n” and “m” as left and right 
response key for the other task (right hand). Participants 
were seated at approximately 60 cm from the screen (uncon-
strained). At this distance, 1 cm on screen corresponds to 
approximately 1° of visual angle.
Stimuli and procedure—task switching
On each trial, participants either responded to an easy letter 
task or a more difficult prime number task. In the relatively 
easier letter task, a letter stimulus (B, D, F, H, S, U, W, or 
Y) had to be categorized as being nearer to A vs. nearer to Z 
in the alphabet by pressing a left or right response key with 
the left or right hand, respectively. In the relatively more 
difficult number task, an appearing number (15, 17, 19, 21, 
23, 25, 27, or 29) had to be categorized as prime number 
vs. not a prime number. The stimulus of one task always 
appeared above a central fixation dot (Origin font, 28 pt.) 
and the stimulus of the other task below (each presented 
with 1.5° distance to the fixation dot). Mapping of number 
or letter task to position on the screen was fixed but counter-
balanced across participants, while responses to the upper 
task were always given with the left hand. All stimuli were 
displayed in black ink (Calibri font, bold, 28 pt., bold, ~ 1° 
of visual angle) on a white background—and their number 
and identity indicated trial type and task, respectively: When 
two stimuli appeared on a given trial, participants were free 
to choose which task to perform (voluntary task choice), 
while a single stimulus indicated a forced-choice trial. Note 
that instructions emphasized that participants were com-
pletely free in their decision—in contrast to for example the 
standard voluntary task switching instruction introduced by 
(Arrington & Logan, 2004).
The experiment started with two short single-task prac-
tice blocks comprising 16 trials each, so that each stimulus 
randomly appeared 2 times, always starting with the difficult 
prime number task. This was followed by one practice block 
of forced-choice trials (half switch, half repeat trials), and 
another of voluntary task switching trials (16 trials each). 
A subsequent baseline block of 128 trials consisted of both 
forced-choice and free-choice trials (half forced, half free, 
pseudorandomized with stimulus repetitions excluded and 
50% switches on the forced-choice trials). During this base-
line block, individual RT thresholds for earning the high 
reward in the following test phase were calculated as the 30th 
percentile (correct RTs ordered from fast to slow) separately 
for each condition. The following test phase consisted of two 
blocks of 256 trials each. All stimuli appeared equally often, 
but without direct stimulus repetitions, pseudorandomized 
so that all conditions (Reward sequence × Trial type × Task) 
valent stimuli (letters and digits), asymmetrical switch costs will not 
be an issue. That means, the switch to the difficult task will in fact be 




appeared about equally often and equally distributed.2 Par-
ticipants were encouraged to rest between blocks.
The trial procedure for both forced-choice and free-choice 
trials is depicted in Fig. 2. Each trial began with the presen-
tation of the reward cue. To allow for changes of the reward 
cue on every trial, we used three different colors per reward 
magnitude: low reward was always announced by one of 
three different hues of gray (RBG values: 169, 169, 169; 
128, 128, 128; 90, 90, 90). High reward was announced by 
a task cue displayed in either blue (30,144, 255), red (240, 
128, 128), or yellow (255, 215, 0). On low reward trials, 
each correct response was rewarded with one point, on high 
reward trials participants could gain seven points for cor-
rect responses below the individual RT criterion from the 
baseline block. After 500 ms, the stimulus (on forced-choice 
trials) or stimuli (on free-choice trials) appeared on screen 
until a response was given. A feedback display was pre-
sented for 500 ms, informing the participants about whether 
they earned the reward on a given trial. If they made an 
incorrect response, the German word for wrong (“Falsch”) 
appeared on the screen and, in case of a high reward pros-
pect, a correct, but too slow response was followed by a 
feedback screen where the words “Zu langsam” (too slow) 
were shown. In case of a correct (and for high-reward pros-
pect trials, fast enough) response, “Richtig” (correct) was 
displayed. This was followed by either a short (100 ms) 
intertrial interval (ITI) after correct responses or a long 
(1000 ms) ITI after an error was made.
At the beginning of the test phase, participants were told 
that they could earn points for correct (low reward) or fast 
and correct responses (high reward) to take part in a com-
petition: the best three participants in the experiment won 
a 15, 10, and 5 € Amazon voucher (cf. Fröber et al., 2018).
Effort discounting task
In the effort discounting procedure adapted from Westbrook 
et al. (2013), participants were told that they had to per-
form another block of either the letter or the digit task. They 
could decide between either doing another block of the digit 
task for a fixed amount of 2 Euros, or the letter task for a 
smaller amount. Before this last block of 32 single-task tri-
als, participants had to go through 6 effort discounting tri-
als: in the first, they were offered the choice of either doing 
a difficult-taskblock for 2€ or an easy-task block for 1€.3 
Depending on their choice, the amount offered for the easy-
task block was adapted in a trial-wise staircase procedure: 
it was incrementally increased or decreased by 50cts, 25cts, 
13cts, depending on whether the participants chose to do 
the difficult task or not. An example of such a decision tree 
is depicted in Fig. 3. To emphasize the seriousness of the 
respective decisions, participants were told that one of their 
decisions would be randomly chosen as the task type and 
Fig. 2  Trial procedure of a forced-choice trial (A) and a free-choice 
trials (B)
3 Note that we never mentioned the words “difficult” vs. “easy” task 
in the instructions but always described the tasks by their respective 
stimuli (digit vs. letter).
2 Whether the first forced choice trial after a free choice trial con-
stitutes a switch or repetition was necessarily contingent on an indi-
vidual’s choice. That means that for a participant who voluntarily 
switches more often to the difficult task it is more likely that an easy 
task as the first forced choice (in a row) constitutes a task switch. And 
conversely, for a participant who switches voluntarily more often to 
the easy task it is more likely that an easy forced choice task is a task 
repetition. That is, while transition (repeat vs. switch) and task type 
(easy vs. difficult) were equally distributed on forced choices, the spe-
cific factor combination was not. In fact, a participant who voluntarily 
switched more often to the difficult task was relatively more likely to 
receive fewer forced switches to the difficult task, and a participant 
who voluntarily switched less often to the difficult task was relatively 
more likely to receive more forced switches to the difficult task. This 
is not a critical confound because, if anything, it would work against 
our hypothesis: After all, more (and not less) forced switches to stim-
uli of the difficult task should increase VSR to the difficult task (see 
Chiu, Fröber & Egner, 2020).
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amount of money for the last block (while in fact, the deci-
sion of the third effort discounting trial was used for the last 
block). They were also instructed that the monetary offer 
would only be paid if performance on this last block was 
sufficiently fast and accurate.
Design
The voluntary switch rate on free choice trials was the 
main dependent measure in a two (task difficulty: easy, dif-
ficult) × 4 (reward sequence: remain low, increase, remain 
high, decrease) repeated-measures design. The VSR was 
defined as the number of switches to a task in a given 
reward-sequence condition relative to the number of all 
free-choice trials in that condition. In addition, we analyzed 
reaction times (RT, in ms) and error rates (ERR) as a func-
tion of task difficulty, task transition (repeat vs. switch), and 
reward sequence on forced-choice trials.4 We calculated the 
objective effort costs as the overall difference between RTs 
for (forced) difficult task and the (forced) easy task. We cal-
culated the subjective value of effort for each participant as 
the difference between the amount of money offered for an 
easy-task block and the fixed 2 Euros for the difficult-task 
block in the last effort discounting trial: that is, if partici-
pants had a high difference between those amounts (a high 
subjective value of effort), participants would forgo a higher 
amount of money to avoid the more difficult task. Subjective 
and objective effort costs will be used as predictors and the 
overall VSR to the difficult task and VSR to the difficult task 




Before all data analyses, the first trial of each block was 
excluded (0.4% of all trials), as it does not entail task tran-
sition nor reward sequence. Four subjects5 were excluded, 
either due to extremely high ERRs in the difficult task (with 
an accuracy that was not considerably different from chance, 
three subjects) or due to extremely high ERRs in the easy 
task (deviating more than three interquartile ranges from the 
grand median, one subject). For the RT analysis only, we 
further excluded incorrect trials (12.9%), trials immediately 
following incorrect responses (11%) and trials with RTs 
that were three SDs above or below the subject’s cell mean 
(0.74%). In the VSR analysis, correct and erroneous trials 
were included to cover all attempts of deliberate switching 
(Arrington & Logan, 2004). In error trials, the chosen task 
was inferred from the selected hand as it is assumed that 
participants rather choose the wrong finger than the wrong 
hand (Scheffers & Coles, 2000).
VSR analysis
Individual and overall mean VSR are depicted in Fig. 4. 
The two main effects and the interaction were highly sig-
nificant: participants chose the easy task more often than 
the difficult task, F(1, 95) = 75.40, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.44, they 
switched more often when reward prospect increased, F(3, 
285) = 28.78, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.23, and reward sequence 
had a stronger effect on choices for the easy task, F(3, 
285) = 14.41, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.132. Critically, and repli-
cating the findings from Jurczyk et al., (2019), participants 
chose the difficult task more often when reward prospect 
increased compared to all other reward sequences: increase 
vs. remain low, F(1, 95) = 19.08, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.17, 
increase vs. remain high, F(1, 95) = 19.34, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 




 = 0.08. All other comparisons were nonsignificant (all 
Fs < 2.10, all ps > 0.15). For the easy task, the picture was 
more complex, as all reward sequences significantly deviated 
























Fig. 3  EDT procedure in Experiments 1 and 2. The offer for the dif-
ficult task-block remains fixed at 2 Euros on every choice. The offer 
for the easy task-block shown here starts with 1 Euro and is then 
sequentially adjusted depending on the participant’s individual choice 
(increase when the difficult task is chosen, decrease when the easy 
task is chosen). The grey offers are the ones following a decision for 
the difficult task (i.e., increase the offer for the easy task), the white 
offers follow a decision for the easy task. Not all potential outcomes 
are shown in the figure
4 RTs and error rates on voluntary choices are presented in the sup-
plemental online materials.
5 Exclusion of these participants had no impact on the statistical pat-
tern of results obtained.
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only marginally significant difference between remain low 
and increase, F(1, 95) = 3.19, p = 0.077. The highest VSR to 
the easy task could be found under decreasing reward pros-
pect, followed in descending order by the increase, remain 
low, and remain high condition.
Forced‑choice trials, RT data
In the RT analysis, all three main effects were significant: 
participants were slower on the difficult as compared to 
the easy task, F(1, 95) = 216.3, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.70. They 
were slower on task switches as compared to task repeti-
tions, F(1, 95) = 245.3, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.72, and they were 
generally faster on high reward (increase, remain high) 
as compared to low reward (decrease, remain low) trials, 
F(3, 285) = 17.4, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.16. These main effects 
were qualified by three two-way interactions: switch costs 
were larger for the more difficult task than for the easy task 
(156 ms vs. 99 ms), as indicated by the interaction of task 
and task transition, F(1, 95) = 27.0, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.22. 
Moreover, the difference in RTs between high and low 
reward prospect was more pronounced for the difficult task, 
task × reward sequence, F(3, 285) = 4.27, p = 0.006, 2
p
 = 
0.04. In the high-reward conditions (increase and remain 
high) as compared to the low-reward conditions (decrease 
and remain low), participants were 62 ms faster in the dif-
ficult task, but only 30 ms faster in the easy task. Finally, 
the interaction of transition and reward sequence was signifi-
cant, F(3, 285) = 7.60, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.07. Irrespective of 
Fig. 4  Range of individual 
mean voluntary switch rates 
in Experiment 1 as a function 
of task difficulty and reward 
sequence. Block dots represent 
respective overall means (± 1 
SEM)
Table 1  Mean RTs (ms) and error rates (%) for the easy and difficult task as a function of reward sequence and task transition on forced choice 
trials in Experiment 1
Remain low Increase Remain high Decrease
Repetition Switch Repetition Switch Repetition Switch Repetition Switch
Difficult task
RT (SD) 696 (142) 878 (250) 674 (152) 803 (190) 645 (150) 816 (207) 735 (237) 876 (243)
ERR (SD) 17.9 (15.6) 20.6 (14.3) 20.3 (16.2) 22.3 (14.1) 18.9 (13.7) 25.0 (16.0) 18.5 (11.7) 24.9 (16.0)
Easy task
RT (SD) 533 (89) 648 (144) 519 (82) 597 (111) 499 (81) 618 (118) 543 (100) 628 (138)
ERR (SD) 9.46 (7.89) 9.07 (8.86) 10.5 (8.42) 10.6 (12.2) 9.55 (8.25) 11.0 (9.55) 8.01 (7.77) 8.06 (10.1)
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task difficulty, repetitions were fastest with remaining high 
reward prospect (all post hoc comparisons significant, all 
Fs > 4.39, all ps < 0.040), and switches were fastest in the 
increase condition (all Fs > 5.90, all ps < 0.018), replicat-
ing previous findings (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2016; Shen & 
Chun, 2011). The three-way interaction was not significant 
(F < 0.40, p > 0.84). Descriptive statistics are provided in 
Table 1. Finally, we computed the individual mean differ-
ence RT between easy and difficult task (Mdifficult – Measy) on 
forced choices which was later entered as predictor in the 
multiple regression, the overall mean difference was 192 ms 
(range − 89.85–515.47 ms).
Forced‑choice trials, ERR data The same analysis on the 
ERR data revealed main effects of task, F(1, 95) = 189.8, 
p < 0.001, 2
p








 = 0.03. Participants made more errors on the more dif-
ficult task (21.0% vs. 9.5%), on task switches vs. task repeti-
tions (16.4% vs. 14.1%), and on high reward trials as com-
pared to low reward trials (16.0% vs. 14.5%). In addition, 
both two-way interactions involving the factor task were 
significant: task × transition, F(1, 95) = 16.8, p < 0.001; 2
p
 
= 0.15 (switch costs of 4.3% vs. 0.3%, for the difficult and 
easy task, respectively), and of task × reward sequence, F(3, 
285) = 2.64; p < 0.001; 2
p
 = 0.03. In both tasks, participants 
made more errors in high-reward trials compared to remain-
low trials; in decrease trials, though, error rates were lowest 
in the easy task, but comparable to high-reward trials in the 
difficult task (see also Table 1). All other effects were non-
significant (all Fs < 2.20, all ps > 0.103).
Multiple linear regression
To test our main hypothesis of whether the higher voluntary 
switch rate to the difficult task could be predicted by the 
subjective effort costs for the difficult task and/or the actual 
RT costs for the difficult task, we calculated the subjective 
individual effort costs as the difference between the final 
amount of money for the easy task and the 2 Euro for the 
difficult task. Moreover, the mean RT difference of forced 
choice trials between the difficult and the easy task for each 
individual was taken as a marker for the actual effort costs.6 
Both, subjective and objective effort costs were then entered 
as predictors into two multiple regressions with the overall 
VSR to the difficult task (irrespective of reward prospect) 
and with the VSR to the difficult task when reward prospect 
increased as dependent measure.
Overall VSR to the difficult task as DV The regression equa-
tion was significant, F(2, 95) = 31.88, p < 0.001. The R2 for 
the overall model was 0.41 (adjusted R2 = 0.39), indicative 
for a high goodness-of-fit according to Cohen (1988). Par-
ticipants’ predicted VSR to the difficult task is 8.80–0.022 
(RT costs)—0.39 (subjective effort costs). However, only 
the actual RT costs were a significant predictor of the VSR, 
β = − 0.616, t(95) = − 7.08, p < 0.001, whereas subjective 
effort cost was not, β = − 0.05, t(95) = − 0.57, p = 0.57. The 
negative beta weights show that individual VSR to the dif-
ficult task decreased with increasing performance costs.
VSR to  the  difficult task when  reward prospect increases 
as  DV Again, the regression equation was significant, 
F(2,95) = 26.48, p < 0.001. R2 for the overall model was 
0.36 (adjusted R2 = 0.35), indicative for a high goodness-of-
fit (Cohen, 1988). Participants’ predicted VSR to the dif-
ficult task when reward prospect increases is 11.69–0.028 
(RT costs) – 1.23 (subjective effort costs). However, only the 
actual RT costs were a significant predictor of the VSR to the 
difficult task, β = − 0.55, t(95) = − 6.06, p < 0.001, whereas 
subjective effort cost was not, β = − 0.115, t(95) = − 1.27, 
p = 0.20. The negative beta weights show that individual 
VSR to the difficult task on reward increase trials decreased 
with increasing performance costs. Figure 5 shows the cor-
responding partial regression plots. Finally, we conducted 
a sensitivity analysis for multiple linear regression using 
GPower (α = 0.01, power = 0.95, N = 96, 2 predictors) which 
resulted in a minimum effect size of 0.23 and a critical 
F-value of 4.84 allowing to interpret the significant effects 
of our analyses as true positives (Faul et al., 2009).
Discussion
We replicated the VSR findings from Jurczyk et al. (2019) 
and again found that participants generally switched more 
often when reward prospect increased as compared to 
unchanged high reward. Critically, this effect was again 
also found for the difficult task: even though the VSR to the 
difficult task was lower, a subset of participants voluntarily 
chose the more difficult task especially when reward pros-
pect increased. This allowed to look into potential sources of 
this seemingly irrational behavior. Two individual markers, 
the subjective effort costs for the difficult task and the objec-
tive RT costs for the difficult task were used to predict the 
overall VSR to the difficult task and more specifically when 
reward prospect increased. Results from linear regression 
analyses show that our predictors explained between 35 and 
6 To account for the slight imbalances within the factor combi-
nation for switches and repetitions to the difficult and easy task on 
forced choices, we also computed this difference score over the fac-
tor level combinations (i.e.  [meanDifficultswitch +  meanDifficultrep]—
[meanEasyswitch +  meanEasyrep]. This difference measure was highly 
correlated with the respective performance costs based on the raw 
data (r = .94, p < .001) and the regression analyses using this RT cost 
difference as predictor yielded qualitatively the same results.
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39% of the variance. A closer look at the beta weights shows 
that the objective RT costs explained most of the variance: 
the higher the objective RT costs for the difficult task, the 
less a participant switched voluntarily to the difficult task. 
The subjective effort costs did not further predict VSR to 
the difficult task. This suggests that participants’ choice of 
the difficult task was modulated by the ease with which they 
were able to accomplish the task and not by the subjective 
effort costs. However, in Experiment 1, the objective and 
subjective costs were measured for the exact same set of 
tasks. Therefore, participants may have used introspective 
RT costs for the difficult task to make their decision in the 
EDT (Bratzke & Bryce, 2019). In Experiment 2, we there-
fore aimed to measure objective costs and subjective effort 
costs independently from each other. To do so, we re-ran 
the same hybrid voluntary task switching experiment, but 
used different tasks in the EDT in Experiment 2. In particu-
lar, we added two EDT blocks, one with data-limited tasks 
and one with resource-limited tasks (Norman & Bobrow, 
1975). Data-limited means that increasing effort does not 
help to improve performance as for example in perceptual 
fluency tasks (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Since low per-
ceptual fluency is experienced as aversive and therefore is to 
be avoided (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011; Reber et al., 1998; 
Song & Schwarz, 2008), the effort costs in this task is suited 
to measure the subjective aversion costs separately from the 
effort avoidance costs. Resource-limited means that increas-
ing effort does improve your performance, like for example 
in math tasks. To sum up, Experiment 2 comprised a hybrid 
task switching phase with voluntary and forced task choices 
between an easy and a difficult task and randomly chang-
ing reward prospects. This part was identical to Experiment 
1. This was followed by two EDT blocks (counterbalanced 
across participants). In one EDT block, participants made 
iterative choices between an easy and a more difficult math 
task. This allowed to measure general subjective effort costs 
independent from the tasks participants already knew from 
the preceding task switching experience. In the other EDT 
block, participants made iterative choices between an easy 
and a more difficult fluency task. This allowed to measure 





Another 100 students from the University of Regensburg 
participated in this second experiment. They were between 
Fig. 5  Partial regression plots (Experiment 1) of VSR to the difficult task (upper panels) of VSR to the difficult task when reward prospect 
increased (lower panels) vs. objective effort costs (left panels), and vs. subjective effort costs (right panels). VSR voluntary switch rate
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18 and 50 years old (M = 23.3 years; SD = 3.9). Of all par-
ticipants, 37 studied psychology, 76 were female, and 3 were 
left-handed. Informed consent was provided by all subjects 
prior to the experiment.
Stimuli, procedure, and design
The entire task switching part was identical to Experiment 
1. Instead of an effort discounting procedure using the same 
two tasks as in the test session, participants now worked 
through two effort discounting procedures involving differ-
ent tasks (order counterbalanced). In the effort discounting 
task with math problems, participants made iterative choices 
between doing a block of non-carrying addition problems 
(easy task) or division problems in the multiplication table 
of the integers 3 through 9. In the effort discounting task 
with a fluency manipulation (adapted from Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2011), participants could choose between a high 
fluency and easy-to-read (Arial font, 17 pt., black) or disflu-
ent and more difficult-to-read (Mistral font, 22 pt, light grey, 
see Table 2 for examples for both tasks) number catego-
rization block (categorizing single-digit numbers as being 
smaller or larger than five). Again, participants were told 
that they would have to carry out one block depending on 
one of their (randomly drawn) decisions, and would get the 
associated offered reward if they responded sufficiently fast 
and accurate. The math and the fluency tasks were chosen to 
make sure that participants would understand with the first 
encounter of the example we gave them (see Table 2), what 
the more difficult and what the easy task would be.
Accordingly, we calculated the subjective aversion 
costs and subjective cognitive effort costs as the difference 
between the last offered amounts for the easy and the fixed 
2 Euros for the difficult option in both EDT blocks.
Results
Data preprocessing
Again prior to all analyses, the first trial of each block was 
excluded (0.4% of all trials). Before the RT analysis only, 
incorrect trials (13.2%), trials following errors (11.3%), and 
trials whose RTs deviated more than three SDs from the sub-
ject’s cell mean (0.8%). In addition, data of four participants 
were excluded from all analyses: two of them had a mean 
RT that deviated more than three interquartile ranges from 
the grand median and another two subjects made more than 
50% errors in the difficult task.
Table 2  Examples for the fluency and math tasks in the effort dis-
counting procedure of Experiment 2
Easy Difficult
Fluency-task (subjective  
aversion costs)
seven seven
Math-task (cognitive effort costs) 2 + 5 36:9
Fig. 6  Range of individual 
mean voluntary switch rates 
in Experiment 2 as a function 
of task difficulty and reward 
sequence. Block dots represent 





Individual and overall mean VSR as a function of reward 
sequence and difficulty are depicted in Fig. 6. As in Experi-
ment 1, the main effects and the interaction were highly sig-
nificant, main effect of task, F(1, 95) = 80.59, p < 0.001, 2
p
 
= 0.46, main effect of reward sequence, F(3, 285) = 27.94, 
p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.23, and the interaction of task and reward 
sequence, F(3, 285) = 10.04, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.10. Replicat-
ing Experiment 1, all planned comparisons regarding the 
VSR to the difficult task between increase and the other three 
reward sequence conditions were significant, with the high-
est VSR to the difficult task with increasing reward prospect: 
increase vs. remain low, F(1, 95) = 12.23, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 




 = 0.21, and increase vs. decrease, F(1, 95) = 6.92, 
p = 0.010, 2
p
 = 0.06. In addition, the VSR to the difficult 
task was lowest under remaining high reward prospect: 
remain high vs. remain low, F(1, 95) = 4.21, p = 0.043, 2
p
 




 = 0.08. In contrast, the VSR to the easy task was highest 
under decreasing reward prospect (and again lowest under 
remaining high reward prospect): decrease vs. remain low, 
F(1, 95) = 20.24, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.18, decrease vs. increase, 
F(1, 95) = 8.57, p = 0.004, 2
p
 = 0.08, decrease vs. remain 
high, F(1, 95) = 57.97, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.38, remain high vs. 
remain low, F(1, 95) = 10.23, p = 0.002, 2
p
 = 0.10, remain 
high vs. increase, F(1, 95) = 18.65, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.16. All 
other single comparisons were nonsignificant (all Fs < 3.14, 
all ps > 0.07).
Forced‑choice trials, RT data
Again, all three main effects were significant, task, F(1, 
93) = 188.2, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.67, task transition, F(1, 
93) = 276.2, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.75, and reward sequence, F(3, 
279) = 15.7, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.14. The significant two-way 
interaction of task and transition replicates the finding of 
larger switch costs for the more difficult task as compared 




 = 0.06. Also, the interaction of transition and reward 
sequence was significant, F(3, 279) = 9.80, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 
0.10, with fastest repetitions in remain-high trials and fast-
est switches in increase trials. Neither the two-way inter-
action task × reward sequence, F(3, 279) = 2.20, p = 0.094, 
nor the three-way interaction, F(3, 279) = 1.5, p = 0.220, 
reached significance (for descriptive statistics see Table 3). 
We again computed the individual mean difference RT 
between easy and difficult task (Mdifficult – Measy) on forced 
choices which was later entered as predictor in the multiple 
regression, the overall mean difference was 194 ms (range 
− 44.60–724.93 ms).
Forced‑choice trials, ERR data
The ERR ANOVA replicated the results of Experiment 
1. The three main effects were significant, task, F(1, 
95) = 129.8, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.58, transition, F(1, 95) = 15.4, 
p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.14, and reward sequence, F(3, 285) = 9.31, 
p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.09. Participants made more errors on the 
more difficult task vs. the easy task (20.8% vs. 10.3%), when 
they switched tasks as compared to repeating them (16.7% 
vs. 14.4%), and on high-reward trials in contrast to low-
reward trials (16.8% vs. 14.3%). These main effects were 
qualified by two two-way interactions, task × transition, F(1, 
95) = 6.18, p = 0.015; 2
p
 = 0.06 (switch costs of 3.7% vs. 
1.1%, for the difficult and easy task, respectively), and of 
task × reward sequence, F(3, 285) = 3.70; p = 0.012; 2
p
 = 
0.04. As in Experiment 1, switch costs were higher for the 
more difficult task (3.7% vs. 1.1%). And again in both tasks, 
participants made less errors in low-reward trials compared 
to high-reward trials; this difference was less pronounced for 
decrease trials of the difficult task and increase trials of the 
easy task. No other effect was significant (all Fs < 0.90, all 
ps > 0.520; descriptive statistics in Table 3).
Table 3  Mean RTs (ms) and error rates (%) for the easy and difficult task as a function of reward sequence and task transition on forced choice 
trials in Experiment 2
Remain low Increase Remain high Decrease
Repetition Switch Repetition Switch Repetition Switch Repetition Switch
Difficult task
RT (SD) 709 (172) 884 (253) 702 (207) 778 (172) 653 (158) 803 (178) 748 (222) 884 (292)
ERR (SD) 14.9 (11.6) 20.2 (14.5) 20.7 (17.7) 24.7 (14.7) 21.0 (14.6) 23.6 (14.9) 19.5 (13.0) 22.3 (15.2)
Easy task
RT (SD) 540 (101) 667 (138) 511 (65.5) 594 (103) 501 (65.5) 615 (125) 566 (153) 654 (159)




To investigate whether the higher voluntary switch rate to 
the difficult task (when reward prospect increases) would 
again be predicted by the actual RT costs and whether and 
to what extent subjective effort costs and/or subjective aver-
sion costs would further explain the variance, the follow-
ing indices were used as predictors: we again calculated the 
subjective cognitive effort costs as the difference between 
the final amount of money for the easy addition task and the 
2 Euros for the difficult division task. We further calculated 
the subjective aversion costs as the difference between the 
final amount of money for the fluent task and the 2 Euros for 
the disfluent task. Finally, the mean RT difference of forced 
choice trials between the difficult and the easy task for each 
individual was taken as a marker for the actual effort costs.7 
All three, subjective cognitive effort, subjective aversion 
and objective effort costs were then entered as predictors 
into two multiple regressions with the overall VSR to the 
difficult task (irrespective of reward prospect) and with the 
VSR to the difficult task when reward prospect increased as 
dependent measure.
Overall VSR to the difficult task as DV The regression equa-
tion was significant, F(2, 95) = 17.03, p < 0.001. The R2 for 
the overall model was 0.36 (adjusted R2 = 0.34), indicative 
for a high goodness-of-fit (Cohen, 1988). Participants’ pre-
dicted VSR to the difficult task is 9.11–0.019 (RT costs) – 
1.82 (subjective cognitive effort costs) + 0.17 (subjective 
aversion costs). As in Experiment 1, the actual RT costs 
were again a significant predictor of the VSR to the diffi-
cult task, β = − 0.54, t(95) =  − 5.93, p < 0.001. This time, 
also the subjective effort costs seems to contribute signifi-
cantly, β = − 0.20, t(95) = − 1.99, p = 0.050, whereas sub-
jective aversion costs did not predict VSR to the difficult 
task, β = 0.11, p = 0.31. The negative beta weights show that 
individual VSR to the difficult task decreased with increas-
ing RT and cognitive effort costs. Figure 7 shows the cor-
responding partial regression plots. Finally, we conducted 
a sensitivity analysis for multiple linear regression using 
GPower (α = 0.01, power = 0.95, N = 96, 3 predictors) which 
resulted in a minimum effect size of 0.25 and a critical 
F-value of 4.00 allowing to interpret the significant effects 
of our analyses as true positives (Faul et al., 2009).
Fig. 7  Partial regression plots (Experiment 2) of overall VSR to the difficult task vs. objective effort costs (upper left panel), vs. subjective effort 
costs (right panel), and vs. subjective aversion costs (lower panel). VSR voluntary switch rate
7 As in Experiment 1, the alternative RT difference based on the 
respective mean RTs for switches and repetitions to the easy and diffi-
cult task were highly correlated with these performance costs (r = .95, 
p < .001) and entering this measure into the regression analyses 
yielded qualitatively the same results.
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VSR to  the  difficult task when  reward prospect increases 
as  DV Again, the regression equation was significant, 
F(2,95) = 12.21, p < 0.001. R2 for the overall model was 
0.28 (adjusted R2 = 0.26), again indicative for a high good-
ness-of- (Cohen, 1988). Participants’ predicted VSR to the 
difficult task when reward prospect increases is 11.41–0.024 
(RT costs) – 1.86 (subjective effort costs) + 0.76 (subjec-
tive aversion costs). However, only the actual RT costs 
were a significant predictor of the VSR to the difficult task, 
β = − 0.49, t(95) = − 5.18, p < 0.001, whereas subjective 
effort cost, β = − 0.156, t(95) = − 1.46, p = 0.14, and the 
subjective aversion costs were not, β = 0.07, t(95) = 0.595, 
p = 0.55. The negative beta weights show that individual 
VSR to the difficult task on reward increase trials decreased 
with increasing effort costs and non-significantly with 
increasing subjective effort costs. Figure 8 shows the cor-
responding partial regression plots.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we aimed to further investigate the poten-
tial role for subjective effort and aversion costs during vol-
untary task choice between an easy and a difficult task. With 
respect to the task switching block, the basic effects from 
Experiment 1 were perfectly replicated. Likewise, we rep-
licated the association between objective RT costs for the 
difficult task and the VSR to the difficult task (when reward 
prospect increased). The lower the actual performance cost 
for the difficult task of a given participant, the higher the 
VSR to this task. But we found only weak support for the 
idea that subjective effort costs measured in an unrelated 
math task further explain the voluntary choice for the prime 
task. With respect to the overall VSR, we in fact found a 
(just) significant effect, suggesting that some general effort 
avoidance may have biased participants against switching 
to the difficult task in general, but this effect played no role 
when reward prospect increased. Finally, we did not find any 
effect for the subjective aversion costs on voluntary choice 
for the difficult task.
General discussion
With the present study, we aimed to investigate two poten-
tial sources for the so-called effort paradox (Inzlicht et al., 
2018) that describes the phenomenon that people occa-
sionally seem to prefer a more effortful task over a less 
effortful one. We argued that for some people the alleg-
edly more effortful task in fact is not more effortful and/
or that some people simply do not mind the additional 
effort. That is, humans may decide for a more difficult 
task either because the more difficult task does not incur 
higher performance costs (objective costs) or because they 
do not mind the higher effort costs (subjective costs). To 
Fig. 8  Partial regression plots (Experiment 2) of the VSR to the difficult task when reward prospect increases vs. objective effort costs (upper 
left panel), vs. subjective effort costs (right panel), and vs. subjective aversion costs (lower panel). VSR voluntary switch rate
Psychological Research 
1 3
this end, our participants made iterative choices between 
an easy and a more difficult task in a hybrid task switch-
ing paradigm with forced and free choices. We measured 
the objective RT costs as the difference between the dif-
ficult and the easy task. And we used the EDT (Westbrook 
et al., 2013) to measure the subjective effort costs for the 
difficult task (Experiment 1) or for a new difficult task 
and a low-fluency task (Experiment 2). The main findings 
can be summarized as follows: (1) Overall, participants 
strongly prefer the easy over the difficult task as indicated 
by the generally higher VSR to the easy task. (2) In both 
experiments, a subset of participants sometimes voluntar-
ily chooses the difficult task, especially so when reward 
prospect increases. (3) This latter effect is predicted by the 
objective performance cost: the lower these performance 
costs for an individual, the higher the VSR to the difficult 
task (when reward prospect increases). (4) We found only 
marginal support for the idea that the subjective effort 
costs further modulate voluntary task choice: In Experi-
ment 2, the subjective effort costs were a (just) significant 
predictor of the overall VSR to the difficult task (but not 
for the VSR when reward prospect increased). The subjec-
tive aversion costs were no reliable predictor.
The VSR data thus perfectly replicate previous find-
ings from Jurczyk et al., (2019). The association found 
with the objective costs here suggests that the sequential 
reward effect for the difficult task may underly the same 
mechanisms as the sequential reward effect in general. As 
already outlined in the introduction and elsewhere, we argue 
that the general reward sequence effect (higher VSR when 
reward prospect increases than when reward remains high) 
could be explained by a lowering of the updating threshold 
in working memory in response to the unexpected increase 
in reward (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Dreisbach & Fröber, 
2019; Fröber & Dreisbach, 2020). That means, we do not 
need to assume an additional mechanism to explain the same 
phenomenon for the VSR to the difficult task because those 
participants who switch to the more difficult task are those 
who do not show much of a performance difference between 
both tasks. Now, one may argue that the RT costs are not 
cause but rather effect of the higher VSR to the difficult 
task. In other words, participants show lower objective RT 
costs because they choose the difficult task more often and 
therefore have more practice with the difficult task. While 
we cannot rule out this argument in its entirety, we think that 
this argument would only hold if we had used a “pure” vol-
untary task switching paradigm. Remember that we used the 
hybrid task switching paradigm with 50% forced choices. By 
this we made sure that all participants had to do the difficult 
task on 25% of all trials. This made sure that all participants 
received the same amount of practice with the difficult task 
on forced choices (from which the RT costs were measured). 
We therefore think that a potential practice effect from the 
higher VSR may at best have added to the effect but cannot 
explain it entirely.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that administered 
the cognitive effort discounting paradigm (COG-ED) to pre-
dict choice behavior between tasks of unequal difficulty. In 
the original study by Westbrook et al. (2013), the authors 
showed that the paradigm is sensitive to task load in a n-back 
working memory task: subjective effort costs increased with 
increasing working memory load (n), confirming an overall 
tendency towards effort avoidance. And they also showed 
that these costs vary between participants depending on 
cognitive engagement as measured by the Need for Cogni-
tion Scale (NCS, Cacioppo et al., 1984) and on age, and 
cannot be explained by task performance: the subjective 
effort costs were negatively correlated with the NCS and 
older participants tended to discount more. This associa-
tion between subjective effort costs and task difficulty has 
recently been confirmed for children (Chevalier, 2018) and 
adolescents (Kramer et al., 2021). However, whether and to 
what extent these costs are suited to predict effortful behav-
ior has not been investigated. Therefore, at the moment, we 
can only speculate about the reasons for the only moderate 
effect found in Experiment 2. One potential reason may be 
that the effort discounting procedure is not sensitive enough 
to measure individual differences in effort avoidance inde-
pendent from the individual performance in the respective 
task. This might at least explain why we did not find any 
effect in Experiment 1 where we used the same tasks during 
voluntary task switching (as the dependent measure) and 
the EDT (as the predictor). But it might also be true that the 
bias in favor of the easy task was just too strong leaving not 
much room for the potential influence of the individual effort 
costs. In any case, we still think that the EDT is a promising 
tool to measure the individual willingness to exert effort and 
therefore deserves further examination.
The results presented here complement recent studies 
investigating voluntary choice behavior in task switching. 
For example, Mittelstädt and colleagues (2018a, 2018b) 
manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) for 
task repetitions with increasing numbers of direct (volun-
tary) task repetitions. That is, the stimulus for a potential 
task switch was made available immediately whereas the 
stimulus for a potential repetition was only presented after 
a certain (adaptively increasing) interval. It turned out that 
participants switched more often when the SOA and thus 
the costs for waiting approached or even exceeded the costs 
of switching. This finding converges with ours in that it 
again shows that participants are sensitive to performance 
costs and adjust their task choice accordingly. Likewise, the 
authors repeatedly found a significant correlation between 
switch costs and the repetition rate (Mittelstädt et al., 2018a, 
2018b), again supporting our claim that participants’ choice 
for a task repetition or shift is—to a large part—determined 
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by economic (RT costs) considerations. Likewise, Mayr 
and Bell (2006) had shown that switch costs in a block of 
forced alternating runs (AABB) correlated negatively with 
the VSR in a then following voluntary task switching block. 
Our findings extend these observations as we have shown 
that not only switch costs per se but also the differential per-
formance costs for a given task (and to a lesser degree indi-
vidual effort avoidance as measured by the EDT) modulate 
this choice behavior. Given that tasks in everyday life are 
rarely balanced for difficulty and effort, this finding furthers 
our understanding of human action selection.
Another aspect we would like to address shortly is the 
relationship between objective effort costs and perfor-
mance costs. Critically, the invested effort cannot directly 
be inferred from performance like the RT difference between 
the difficult and the easy task alone. After all, performance 
in a given task is a result of ability, success importance and 
invested effort, and most presumably a mixture of all three 
(Wright et al., 2019). That is, to obtain the same result, some 
participants may have to invest more effort than others (e.g., 
Smith & Hess, 2015). This reasoning has already been expli-
cated in the motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 
1989) which predicts—for known difficulty, as is the case in 
our experiment—increasing effort investment with increas-
ing task difficulty (until the invested effort is no longer jus-
tified by the obtained outcome). Support for this associa-
tion come from studies, using (sympathetic) cardiovascular 
reactivity scores as objective measures of effort, showing 
increasing reactivity with increasing task difficulty (for a 
review see Richter et al., 2016). Even though performance 
measures (depending on task difficulty) and cardiovascular 
measures often correlate (e.g., Richter et al., 2008), this does 
not necessarily have to be the case.
On a more general level, the obtained results allow to 
conclude that participants who voluntarily choose the more 
difficult task may be those who do not pay a high price for 
the additional effort in terms of actual RT costs. This is an 
important finding because it shows that simply observing 
choice behavior without taking individual ability and per-
formance into account can be misleading. That means, our 
results show that the effort-paradox can in part be explained 
by the fact that effort is not an objective feature of an action 
but critically depends on the individual’s capability and 
motivation. This sounds like a rather obvious statement but 
in daily life we are often tempted to draw the wrong con-
clusions from action observation. For example, we tend to 
judge the neighbor who is going for a morning run every 
day in all kinds of weather for a highly disciplined person 
when in fact, running for her might be effortless and disci-
pline is only needed to follow the doctor’s advice for recrea-
tion. In other words, whereas action selection can be readily 
observed, the individually invested costs that are associated 
with the chosen action are harder to infer. Therefore, what 
might seem like an either irrational (“why doing more than 
necessary?”) or disciplined (“always giving your best”) 
choice might in fact be an economic and thus rational choice 
for the individual.
In sum, our results suggest that choosing a more difficult 
task is not primarily a matter of “willpower” (Gailliot & 
Baumeister, 2007) but that in fact the actual performance 
costs (or the lack thereof) may contribute a good share to 
the opportunity costs that arise when choosing one task over 
the other (Kurzban et al., 2013). We do not mean to rule out 
that humans do also favor a more challenging task for other 
reasons than the lack of higher costs (as presented here). 
Inzlicht and colleagues (2018) gathered convincing evidence 
that humans may also favor a more difficult task because the 
invested effort adds value to the product of effort as is exem-
plified in the so-called IKEA effect (Norton et al., 2012) or 
because effort itself is intrinsically rewarding (Eisenberger, 
1992). Note, however, that the reward prospect in our study 
was always contingent on performance but non-contingent 
on task choice [as opposed to (Braun & Arrington, 2018)]. 
That is, the (sequentially changing) reward prospect in our 
study presumably only changed the meta-control state in 
favor of a more or less flexible control mode (e.g., Dreisbach 
& Fröber, 2019; Goschke & Bolte, 2014; Hommel, 2015) 
and thereby the probability to switch. That is, the reward 
prospect in our study affected task choice only indirectly as 
opposed to most studies that use reward to directly motivate 
a certain task choice (Braun & Arrington, 2018). It will be 
an interesting endeavor for future research to find ways to 
investigate potential interactions between these different 
sources of the effort paradox. For example, it is conceivable 
that a person with a long learning history that effort is usu-
ally rewarded—as it is suggested by the learned industrious-
ness approach—might learn to succeed in all sorts of tasks 
thereby perpetuating the choices for more challenging tasks 
because their mastery reduces actual performance costs.
The take home message of the present study is that vol-
untary task choice can be modulated by (1) the control state 
(here manipulated via changing reward prospects) and (2) 
the individual performance costs for the chosen task. An 
increase in reward prospect increases cognitive flexibility 
and the general likelihood to switch. The individual task 
choice follows economic considerations incorporating the 
individual performance costs for the chosen task.
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